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DISCUSSION 
'IS' AND 'OUGHT' IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
Legal philosophers also worry over the distinction between 'is ' and 
'ought'. Two " is-ought " issues currently prominent in legal philosophy 
are (1) whether legal rules belong to the " is " category or to the " ought " 
category, and (2) whether it is possible to distinguish between ' the law as it 
is ' and 'the law as it ought to be'. The latter is an issue which some legal 
philosophers have recently debated in terms of several allegedly inter- 
changeable dichotomies, e.g. ' law and morals ', ' positive law and natural 
law', 'fact and value', 'description and evaluation', 'order and good 
order', and 'is and ought '.' Of course, these dichotomies are not really 
interchangeable. For example, there are both moral and non-moral uses 
of 'ought'. Throughout the ensuing discussion, I have chosen to focus on 
' is and ought ', and have addressed myself to the question whether ' the 
law as it is' and 'the law as it ought to be' are distinguishable. 
To many, it may seem very odd that anyone should deny that ' the 
law as it is' can always be distinguished from 'the law as it ought to be'. 
Yet some legal philosophers, including Professor Lon Fuller of the Harvard 
Law School, have recently argued that, in some contexts, the distinction 
simply cannot be drawn. Although here I will not discuss in general what 
it would be like for the 'is' and the 'ought' to be distinguishable, I will 
state and try to refute several specific arguments that have been advanced 
to establish the indistinguishability of ' the law as it is ' from ' the law as 
it ought to be '. The term ' law ' in the foregoing quoted phrase might mean 
either 'legal system' or 'legal rule '. I shall consider both possibilities. 
" There is a legal system in X." Disagreement over criteria for the 
use of ' legal system ' is common, and I do not propose to define this notion. 
But most would agree that a municipal legal system consists in part of 
rules for controlling human behaviour. Thus, if someone were to say " There 
is a legal system in Bodia ", we would normally understand him to be re- 
ferring to a functioning system of rules, and we would expect to find in 
Bodia rules of social control of prospective operation that are intelligible 
and either known to the citizenry or available to them. We would also 
normally expect to find a scheme of sanctions for non-compliance. These 
features would not be all of the characteristic features of a legal system, but 
we need not enumerate the rest. If a person, A, were to accept such features 
1See especially, L. L. Fuller, " Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Pro- 
fessor Hart ", Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), pp. 630-672. 
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as some of the criteria for use of 'legal system ', and if, on a particular 
occasion, A were to say " There is a legal system in Bodia ", would not A 
be thereby implicitly acknowledging that what he has referred to as the 
legal system of Bodia is what it ought to be at least in the sense that it is 
to some extent serving its purpose, i.e. the control of human behaviour ? 
And would not this show that Bodia's legal system, " as it is ", is in this 
respect indistinguishable from " what it ought to be " ?2 
A's assertion that Bodia has a legal system does imply that what he 
has called the legal system of Bodia is what it ought to be at least in the 
sense that it is to some extent serving its purpose, i.e. controlling human 
behaviour. But this is only to take note of a tautology, for to say that a 
system of rules for controlling behaviour exists is to say, in part, that this 
system is functioning to some extent as it ought to function if it is to serve 
its purpose, i.e. social control.3 Moreover, it still remains possible to 
separate what, for lack of a more concise expression, might be called " is " 
and " ought " components of the " is " judgment that there is a legal system 
in Bodia. Thus, we may distinguish between: (1) the judgment that in 
Bodia there is a body of rules functioning in various ways, and (2) the 
judgment that in view of the purposes for which these rules exist, they 
are functioning as they ought to function. It may be, however, that we 
cannot readily specify precisely when we should say: " This system of rules 
is functioning so ineffectively that it should not be called a legal system"5 
instead of, simply, " This legal system is not functioning effectively ". The 
difficulty here is common to the application of many general concepts. 
When is a stove simply not a stove rather than a malfunctioning one ? 
This difficulty should not, however, be thought of as standing in the way 
of a clear distinction between 'is ' and 'ought ' in particular cases.4 Un- 
certainty with respect to where a line is to be drawn should not be confused 
with unclarity of that line as drawn. Moreover, in other contexts we do not 
hesitate to apply or withhold general terms because we are not certain 
precisely where the line should be drawn: we sometimes call men " tall " 
without being sure just how many inches constitute tallness, and we call 
men " bald " without being sure just how few hairs one must have to be 
bald. Why should we vary our practice where the term is 'law ' ? 
Suppose it is said that a legal system cannot exist unless the " constitu- 
tional"5 rules for identifying the rules of the legal system are accepted by 
the vast majority of the citizenry. Assume further, that it is urged (1) that 
such acceptance can be forthcoming only if the constitutional rules are 
morally as they ought to be, and (2) that from this it follows that when A 
says " There is a legal system in Bodia ", A implicitly acknowledges that 
some part (the constitutional rules) of what A has referred to as the legal 
2A version of this argument has recently been advanced by Fuller. Ib. at 644. 
3E. Nagel, " Fact, Value, and Human Purpose ", Natural Law Forum 4 (1959), 
pp. 30-31. 
4Fuller has argued that it does. Supra, n. 2. 
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system of Bodia is as it ought to be.5 Again, this would not establish the 
indistinguishability of the existing legal system of Bodia from what it ought 
to be. First, I should point out that it is simply not true that public accept- 
ance of the rules for identifying the rules of the system can be forthcoming 
only if those rules are somehow morally what they ought to be. Acceptance 
of such rules may be based on other factors such as fear of force, " calcula- 
tions of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting 
inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do ".6 
But secondly, even if it be conceded that such acceptance could only be 
based on the fact that such rules are morally what they ought to be, this 
would only mean that the " moral oughtness " of these rules is part of the 
definition of 'legal system' so that it becomes tautologous to say: " There 
is a legal system in Bodia having rules for identifying its rules that are 
morally as they ought to be ". Moreover, it would still be possible to separate 
" is " from " ought " (in this limited sense of 'ought') conditions for use of 
the phrase 'There is a legal system in X '. Among the " is " conditions 
would be the existence of a system of rules of control and the fact of public 
acceptance of rules for identifying the rules of this system; among the 
" ought " conditions would be the judgment that such rules are morally 
what they ought to be. 
Even if one or more of the foregoing arguments did establish some way 
or ways in which the legal system " as it is " could not be distinguished 
from the legal system " as it ought to be ", it would still be open to me 
to distinguish between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be in other 
obvious ways. For example, I might say that although there is a system 
of law in Bodia, this system is not administered as it ought to be: the rules 
are unfairly or inconsistently applied. 
" Y is a legal rule." When this phrase is ordinarily used, and used 
correctly, at least the following conditions are normally present: (1) a legal 
system is in operation, and (2) the rule referred to complies with authori- 
tative criteria (or rules) for identifying the rules of the system. Now, if 
A says : " Y is a legal rule ", does not A implicitly acknowledge that Y 
is a functioning rule ? And does not this show that Y, as a functioning 
rule, cannot be distinguished from what it ought to be, i.e. a functioning 
legal rule ? No. Accepted criteria for identifying legal rules in modern 
legal systems do not (though they could) include a requirement that the 
rule be functioning or enforced. In fact, the officials of a moderni legal 
system might not be enforcing Y at all, or the citizenry might be disregarding 
it, but this would not make Y any the less a rule of law. True, A's statement 
' Y is a legal rule' does implicitly commit A to the view that rule Y con- 
forms to criteria to which it must conform if it is to be a legal rule. But this 
only shows that to say that Y is a legal rule is to say that Y is a rule that 
-0f this, Fuller says: " Here, then, we must confess there is something that can 
be called a 'merger ' of law and morality . . .". Supra, n. 1 at 639. 
6H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1959), p. 198. 
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conforms to applicable criteria of legal validity, which is at best tautologous 
and trivial. 
Assume that Y is a statutory rule. Many informed lawyers interpret 
statutes in light of their purpose. To illustrate: assume that a statute 
provides that an acceptance by mail of an offer to contract is effective upon 
mailing. P sends D an offer of wheat seed by mail and D accepts by mail, 
but shortly after depositing the letter of acceptance in the letter-box, D 
learns of another offer at a lower price, and accepts it. He then wires P 
that he does not accept P's offer, and this wire arrives before P receives 
D's letter of acceptance. When P does receive D's letter, he concludes that 
by the literal terms of the statute, his offer was validly accepted and a 
contract was then formed. However, P also asks a lawyer to advise him 
whether he has a contract with D. P might be told that the purpose of 
the statute is to protect the accepting party in a case in which he justifiably 
relies on what he thinks to be a contract at the time of mailing ; accordingly, 
the statute does not apply, for D did not rely. This advice would be based 
on what is sometimes called a " purposive " interpretation of rule Y. Does 
such interpretation somehow establish the indistinguishability of rule Y 
" as it is " from rule Y " as it ought to be ' ? One might argue that to say 
what rule Y is, is in part to say what rule Y means, and in saying what rule 
Y means, one must say what rule Y ought to mean (in view of its purpose); 
hence, rule Y and what rule Y ought to be are in this sense indistinguishable.7 
But even if purposive interpretation be adopted, it is still open to me to 
distinguish between rule Y interpreted literally and rule Y as it ought to 
be interpreted in light of its purpose. Secondly, to say that rule Y is what 
it ought to be (as purposively interpreted) is to use the distinction between 
'is ' and ' ought', not to refute it.8 
Assume that Y is a rule of case law: a court has just decided a novel 
case and applied Y in so doing. Assume also that the court's decision was 
based on an insufficient understanding of the facts, and that informed 
lawyers believe that when the case is re-argued on rehearing, the court, 
being a good court, will probably change its mind. With respect to the facts 
of the case, what is the law as of the time before the rehearing ? (Lawyers 
must often say what the law is in advance of an authoritative pronounce- 
ment.) If A says the law is not rule Y, but rule Z, the rule that the court 
is likely to apply on rehearing, and if A says that the court is likely to apply 
rule Z because, in view of the facts, Z is the only rule that ought to be applied, 
has A conceded that 'is ' and ' ought' are here indistinguishable since the 
rule that is law, in A's judgment, is the rule that ought to be law ? No, 
again A is using the distinction rather than refusing to recognize it or blurring 
it. It is also a well-known fact that judgments as to what would be a good 
rule of law frequently influence not only predictions of what the rule of 
7For a version of this argument, see supra, n. 1, at 661 et. seq. 
8For other criticisms of this argument, see Nakhnikian, " Professor Fuller on Legal 
Rules and Purpose ", Wayne L. Rev. 2 (1956), p. 200. 
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law is, but also influence judicial formulations of the rule. Such judgments 
also play an important role in the application of legal rules.9 
Assume that rule Y has a counterpart in Christian morality and that in 
Bodia Christian morality prevails. If A correctly identifies Y as a rule of 
law in Bodia, does A implicitly acknowledge that Y is what it ought to 
be because of its conformity to Christian morality, and if so, does this 
establish the indistinguishability of ' is ' and ' ought ' ? Not at all. A may 
not accept Christian morality; moreover, even if A did accept Christian 
morality, for A to say that Y is a legal rule and to say that it is what it 
ought to be because it embodies Christian morality, again, would be to 
use and therefore to recognize rather than to refute the distinction. 
But even if one or more of the foregoing arguments did establish some 
way or ways in which a legal rule, " as it is ", could not be distinguished 
from what it ought to be, it would still be open to me to distinguish sharply 
between the 'is' and the 'ought' in other obvious ways. Thus, for example, 
I might say the legal rule is not well drafted and ought therefore to be re- 
drafted. Or I might say the rule is not substantively sound and therefore 
ought to be repealed. 
ROBERT S. SUMMERS 
University of Oregon. 
9See L. Bagolini, " Value Judgments in Ethics and in Law ", The Philosophical 
Quarterly 1 (1951), p. 431. 
